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All authors writing about poverty are faced with the intractable problem of defining exactly
what they mean by the word “poverty”. This is particularly the case if their opinions are to
inform political  debate  since  the  definition  and  measurement  of  poverty  can  have  major
implications for social and economic policy. “Poverty” is by definition a problem about which
something has to be done but appropriate legislation depends on quality assessment rather
than subjective - albeit well-intentioned - banter.
If  poverty is  defined in  terms  of  a  minimum subsistence  income,  then  it  is  enough to
provide individuals  with this  fixed sum for poverty to  be instantaneously eradicated.  The
obvious difficulty here is determining the precise basic income needed to keep body and soul
together. Firstly, this mini-mum income will inevitably vary according to changing needs and
conditions. Secondly, definitions of minimum needs may be more or less arbitrary. Finally, a
fixed amount calculated to meet basic needs may be allocated but then be spent in a variety of
ways, not necessarily the way the authorities think it “should” be1. Some basic needs will be
covered while others will not. In this case the state of poverty will be only partially relieved.
The idea of poverty can be refined by introducing the notion of “deprivation”. Deprivation
focuses on unmet need caused by a lack of resources of various kinds and on a lack of power
within  the  community.  In  respect  of  this,  poverty  becomes  “a  political  concept-and  thus
inherently a contested one” (ALCOCK 3).
The poverty experienced by those with an income inadequate to obtain the bare necessities
of life is referred to as  absolute poverty, whereas deprivation, the fact of living without the
resources necessary to live at a standard considered by society as normal, may be referred to
as  relative poverty.  Absolute poverty is a state which threatens physical survival, whereas
relative poverty suggests the relative inability of the people who suffer from it to live their
lives fully within the community. Thus anti-poverty policies that are solely concerned with
defining  basic  needs  and  their  money  equivalents  tend  to  ignore  the  more  far-reaching
“inalienable rights” that citizenship gives to all members of society2.
In the early days of the welfare state it was believed that all British citizens could be sooner
or  later  protected  from  “want”.  One  of  Beveridge’s  giants  seemed  to  have  been  fatally
wounded if not yet slain. However, despite the increasing prosperity of the late 1950s, when,
according to the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, the British had “never had it so good”,
there were disquieting signs that poverty - at least relative poverty - had not disappeared.
While many people were enjoying a rising standard of living, those living on the margins of
society were becoming relatively worse off. In the 1980s, poverty once again became a hotly
contested political issue.
Poverty may be particularly visible,  for example  when people are seen sleeping in  the
streets. Onlookers may feel deeply indignant that some people should be reduced to such an
existence. But there are less visible forms of poverty which can only be dealt with effectively
if they are measured reliably and their causes clearly understood. There is a clear political
dimension to measuring poverty,  in that the definition of poverty depends to a substantial
extent on the sort of community to which the people aspire.
From Rowntree to Beveridge 
1 The consumption of tobacco and alcohol are ideal examples. A non-smoker and teetotaller will be less poor 
than a counterpart who indulges in both. This begs the question of whether minimum incomes should aim to 
cover this sort of “luxury” consumption.
2 See T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Press, 1950.
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Seebohm Rowntree  is  undoubtedly  one of  the  most  influential  pioneers  in  the  field  of
research on poverty in the 2 0 t  h century.  Following the example of Charles Booth3,  he
undertook  to  look  beyond  the  more  visible  forms  of  poverty  when  he  and  his  team  of
researchers conducted a survey of the unemployed in York, first at the end of the 19 th century
and then again in the 1930s. To compile information Rowntree visited people in their homes
and asked detailed questions in an attempt to piece together a scientific definition of poverty.
Rowntree  determined  the  absolute  minimum  necessary  to  survive  and  his  definition  or
perception of absolute/primary poverty still stands out as a landmark: 
A family living on the scale allowed for must never spend a penny on railway fare or
omnibus.  They must  never  go  into  the  country  unless  they walk.  They must  never
purchase a halfpenny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket for a popular concert.
They must write no letters to absent children, for they cannot afford to pay the postage.
They must  never contribute anything to the church or chapel,  or give any help to a
neighbour which costs them money. They cannot save, nor can they join a sick club or
trade union, because they cannot pay the necessary subscriptions. The children must
have no pocket money for dolls, marbles or sweets. The father must smoke no tobacco
and drink no beer.4 The mother must never buy any pretty clothes for her-self or her
children, the character of the family wardrobe as for the family diet being governed by
the regulation “nothing must be bought but that which is absolutely necessary for the
maintenance of physical health and what is bought must be of the plainest and most
economical description” (ROWNTREE 133-4). 
Although Rowntree’s  research  is  held  in  the  highest  respect  he  has  been criticised  for
having  advocated  unacceptably  low  minimum  incomes.  These  criticisms  are,  however,
unfounded, since : 
..the low income standards that he described, the sort of consumption that he referred to
and perhaps the dispassionate clarity with which he wrote were only a heuristic device
to expose the intolerable conditions of the poor in York,  not recommendations about
how they should live (WHITTON 22).
Rowntree described the minimum requirements in great detail, quantifying the amount of
tea, sugar, meat, butter - to name but a few items - that according to him were necessary in
order  to  guarantee  subsistence.  But  Rowntree  set  his  bare  minimum  against  the  sort  of
consumption that befits normal participation in everyday life, rather like Adam Smith who a
century  earlier  in  The Wealth  of  Nations had  mentioned  the  linen  shirt  as  being  a  basic
requirement for a worker so as not to be seen to be in a state of poverty by outsiders. Linen
shirts have never lifted people out of poverty but, according to Smith, they were a sure sign
that the wearer was not destitute. In the same vein, Rowntree considered that travelling by
train or bus, going to concerts and writing to absent children (see above) meant that people
neither  suffered  from  primary  poverty  nor  were  excluded  from  aspiring  to  “normal”
consumption above and beyond the minimum.
The  substantial  empirical  evidence  that  Rowntree’s  surveys  produced  were  to  prove
invaluable  in  future  debates  on  the  aetiology  of  poverty.  Beveridge  drew  heavily  on
Rowntree’s work when he was asked to review social insurance in Great Britain. Beveridge’s
plan was drawn up during the Second World War when public opinion felt that plans had to
be made for a better and fairer society after the war. It was felt that no single category of the
3 Charles BOOTH, The Life and Labour of the People (of London), London: Williams and Northgate, 1889.
4 See note 1.
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population should be “victimised by the emergency” (VINCENT 114). Wartime was forcing
the  authorities  to  play an  ever  increasing  role  in  people’s  everyday lives  and the  British
government was using its emergency powers to organise the war effort. Evacuation, the utility
scheme and rationing were all examples of this attempt to look after the citizen and ensure
“fair shares for all”.
Sir William Beveridge was a civil servant with a lifetime of experience in studying the
practical details of social legislation. His Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance
and Allied Services consulted numerous organisations, though not the poor themselves. But
the report caught the mood of the time, and was far more than the arid review that many
politicians expected it to be. It was firmly rooted in the traditions of the past, but also reflected
the faith placed at the time in the power of planning:
As a document,  the final  report  belonged to several  eras.  There was a seventeenth-
century  use  of  language,  with  the  Bunyanesque  presentation  of  Want,  Disease,
Ignorance,  Squalor  and Idleness,  the  ‘five  giants  on the  road of  reconstruction’,  an
eighteenth-century enlightenment optimism that  through the free play of reason ‘the
total  abolition  of  want’  was  attainable  once  peace  was  restored,  nineteenth-century
liberal faith in the free market as the ultimate provider of the means of progress and
justice,  and  finally  the  confidence  of  the  early  twentieth-century  bureaucrat  in  the
creative benevolence of the state. (VINCENT 117-8)
To eradicate “want”, Beveridge postulated that a rise in the general standard of living was
the key to success. Increasing prosperity would improve the lot of the majority of the worse-
off. However, Beveridge was aware that his detailed plans for “cradle to the grave” social
insurance had to allow for some residual poverty. To do this Beveridge could have relied on
the  information  provided  by Rowntree  and  other  social  observers  who  had  attempted  to
quantify absolute poverty. Instead, he chose other more academic studies to set his minimum
rates, paying particular attention to the differential between National Insurance and means-
tested rates. The principle of “less eligibility”5 was applied to ensure that the state would not
encourage idleness. This recalled the Victorian distinction between the “deserving” and the
“undeserving” poor.  Those who fell  through the  insurance safety net  were  to  be given a
smaller  allowance  than  those  who had attempted  to  provide  for  themselves  during  better
times.
Beveridge’s intentions were certainly laudable and his convictions sincere. Means-testing6
was to be a last resort solution for the residual poor, since he felt that the state had little right
to  pry  into  the  lives  of  “deserving”  individuals.  Once  distributed,  benefits  derived  from
insurance were to be spent at the discretion of recipients. But by circumventing the need to
measure poverty, his “scheme sought to meet the needs of an imaginary individual by means
of a fictional device” (VINCENT 123). Rowntree, on the other hand, for all his shortcomings,
did  attempt  to  measure  the  poverty  of  real  individuals,  thus  offering  the  authorities  the
possibility of devising a pragmatic response should they feel that anti-poverty policies were
necessary.  His  sincerity  was  based  on  the  reality  of  the  unemployed  in  York,  whereas
Beveridge’s  stemmed  from a  somewhat  opportunistic  idealism and  an  official  remit  that
included a comprehensive inquiry into insurance rather than a study of poverty.
5 According to this Poor Law principle the relief provided by the state should always be less attractive than work,
for otherwise the poor might prefer to live “on benefit” rather than get a job.
6 The Household Means Test had been introduced in 1931 and was bitterly resented by the public since it 
entailed detailed questioning by the authorities into household income. In many cases families were forced into 
shedding responsibility for elderly parents or offspring to avoid losing out on benefit. Even so, the National 
Assistance Act voted in 1948 was to provide means-tested benefits for the “poorest of the poor”. The principle of
“less eligibility” was still alive and kicking.
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You’ve never had it so good
In the aftermath of the war, it was felt that the Labour Government elected after a landslide
victory would be able to enact the principles enshrined in the Beveridge Report and that the
welfare state  would be sufficient  to  stamp out  poverty.  To all  intents  and purposes there
would no longer be any need to measure poverty because everyone “from the womb to the
tomb” would automatically be provided for. Some wartime control continued well beyond the
conflict- rationing for example-and reinforced the general feeling that the whole population
was still “in it together”, encouraging a form of social cohesion that the war years had, it was
generally believed, strengthened immeasurably. In his third study of York, Rowntree came to
the  conclusion  that  the  welfare  state  had  made  considerable  inroads  into  working-class
poverty.7 His findings supported the view that most poverty had disappeared, with the result
that the issue was relegated to a far corner of the political agenda.
To  some  extent,  Beveridge’s  predictions  were  coming  true  since  the  general  rise  in
prosperity was providing ever-increasing funds for the welfare state. Governments were now
financially  equipped  to  cure  poverty.  Added  to  this  was  a  situation  of  more  or  less  full
employment that the country had reached and which according to Beveridge was the sine qua
non condition for economic and moral success.8 Not only could employment prevent poverty
from occurring in the first place but also the more people contributed to the insurance fund,
the more its distributive potential could be exploited. At the same time the lower the rate of
unemployment, the greater opportunity people had to aspire to their place within Beveridge’s
free society.
But the rise in national wealth due to this period of sustained economic expansion had led
to an increase in the National Assistance rates above and beyond inflation. As they rose, an
ever increasing number of people joined the ranks of claimants, even some of the unemployed
whose insurance payments fell short of means tested benefits. National Assistance was fast
becoming an attractive social benefit even for the able bodied and was no longer considered to
be  a  last  resort  reserved  only  for  the  poorest.  As  it  gradually  permeated  through British
society, it added to the overall incremental growth of the welfare state. As new needs were
uncovered  so  new  benefits  were  devised  and  more  hands  needed  to  deal  with  the  ever
increasing  complexity  of  welfare  administration.  The army of  civil  servants  dealing  with
welfare payments - above all the newly created “social workers” - swelled. Government had
never been so closely involved with people’s everyday lives as welfare machinery strove to
calculate discretionary benefits that would eradicate “want”. But the state focused its action
on relieving poverty rather than establishing easily recognizable and quantifiable levels of
deprivation.
To this end means testing, although despised as being an awkward intrusion into the details
of people’s income, had the advantage of shedding light on what could be called “official”
poverty.  Indeed,  it  was  felt  by some that  assistance  should be far  more  selective  so that
benefits could be channelled in the direction of the really needy, those who suffered most
from absolute poverty.  In this respect it would have been a fairly straightforward task for
social workers to compile volumes of information concerning the manifestations of poverty
encountered during their everyday work. But means testing was haunted by the dire reputation
that the inter-war period had bestowed upon it. On the one hand selectivity had forced public
assistance workers to delve deep into unemployed people’s incomes. On the other, measuring
poverty was stigmatising and this went completely against the grain of the sort of welfare
state that the population was hankering after given the success of the Beveridge Report. Those
7 See ROWNTREE B.S., & LAVERS G.R., Poverty and the Welfare State, London: Longmans, 1951.
8 Beveridge’s contribution to the debate on employment, published two years after his Report was entitled Full 
Employment in a Free Society, (emphasis added), London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, November 1944.
7
in receipt of benefits were labelled as being poor and their poverty separated them off from
the rest of the population. Universality had the advantage of being easier to administer if only
because of the vastly inferior amount of paper-work involved. It was also far less socially
divisive than selectivity because it involved far fewer feelings of stigma and to some extent
discrimination.
Growing prosperity and the welfare state had broken Rowntree’s poverty cycle. In 1957,
during a party rally in Bedford, Harold Macmillan famously claimed, “Let’s face it,  most of
our people have never had it so good” [emphasis added]. If it is true that the categories of
people most prone to poverty - namely large families at the beginning of their life-cycle and
isolated  parents  in  old  age - were  by  now  protected  by  National  Assistance,  the  general
expectation  that  “want” was finally  being wiped out was soon disappointed when amidst
growing abundance, poverty was rediscovered.
The poorest of the poor: the forgotten Englishmen 
Politicians and academics can perhaps be forgiven for having believed that the welfare state
had  created  a  poverty-free  society.  This  false  sense  of  security  came  not  only  from the
remarkable success of the welfare state but also from the increasing prosperity of the 1950s.
The growing affluence  was clearly visible,  and the main  social  survey of the period had
shown a sharp decline in poverty.9 The welfare state was fulfilling its role and had apparently
reduced poverty to a residual level. In the long term it was expected to eliminate even the
most intractable “pockets” of poverty. In the words of Coates and Silburn:
To assert that there remained a widespread problem of poverty was to challenge an
integrated set of myths and pieties which had become so widely accepted as to be taken,
by many people, as axiomatic. (COATES & SILBURN 179)
Nonetheless some intellectuals attempted to dispel the widespread myth that poverty no
longer existed. On various occasions Peter Townsend, who was to become arguably the most
influential authority on the subject, pointed out the hard-ship endured by some of the more
vulnerable  groups  in  British  society.  He also  questioned  the  idea  of  establishing  a  fixed
poverty level, since, he argued, needs evolve.10 While Townsend pointed out the difficulty of
defining poverty, Professor Titmuss underlined the weaknesses in the redistributive effects of
the welfare state  and others  criticized  the inadequacy of benefits  especially  for particular
groups. But it took studies such as Abel-Smith and Townsend’s The Poor and the Poorest and
a few years later Coates and Silburn’s Poverty: the Forgotten Englishman to provide a clear
reminder that anti-poverty policies had not ended hardship. Abel-Smith and Townsend used
National  Assistance  rates  reported  in  the  Ministry  of  Labour’  s  Household  Expenditure
Surveys to measure the standard of living that the state was “officially” offering. Their study
created three thresholds: one below the National Assistance rates, one 20% above these basic
rates and the third from 21% to 40% above.11 They came to the conclusion that around 7.5
million people were living on low incomes, or in other words 14.2% of the total population.
The study identified old-age and particularly the presence of children12 as factors contributing
to poverty within families. The major causes of poverty were inadequate National Insurance
9 See note 6.
10 These ideas were exploited at length in Townsend’s authoritative work on poverty in the United Kingdom 
published in 1979. TOWNSEND Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: a Survey of Household Resources and 
Standards of Living, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979.
11 Considering incomes slightly above the official scale rates has two advantages: on the one hand the “margins 
of poverty” are taken into account and on the other, net income for recipient beneficiaries is in some cases higher
than minimum rates due to other sources of income which for the sake of benefit calculation are disregarded.
12 Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) was established that year.
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rates, low wages and low take-up of available benefits, especially National Assistance. To top
it  all,  Abel-Smith  and  Townsend  found  that  around  2  million  people,  or  3.8%  of  the
population, had incomes even below the basic rate, a clear indictment of anti-poverty policies.
Abel-Smith and Townsend’s conclusions were all the more convincing since they did not
restrict their measurement of poverty to the officially recognized National Assistance scales
below which, it must be remembered, people were not supposed to fall. By using the 20% and
20-40% levels above the scales, they managed to show that basic assistance was inadequate
even when improved using discretionary benefits. Above all, what was most striking about
their study was the sheer size of the population affected by poverty. Coates and Silburn chose
to  verify  Abel-Smith  and  Townsend’s  statistics  by  homing  in  on  one  particular  area  of
Nottingham, where “[...] different types of deprivation mesh one into another, to create for
those who must endure them a total social situation shot through and through by one level of
want  after  another”  (COATES  &  SILBURN  50).  What  Abel-Smith  and  Townsend  had
discovered through the study of national statistics was revealed to be even more real when
applied to a restricted area in which “real” individuals endured situations of poverty.
Not only did The Poor and the Poorest shatter the myth that poverty had been successfully
eradicated but it also turned relative poverty into an issue. Until  then, studies on poverty,
including Rowntree’s surveys in York, had all identified more or less the same groups as
being particularly vulnerable to hardship: the elderly, the sick and families with children. But
society had evolved since Rowntree’s heyday and poverty in the United Kingdom could no
longer be considered in absolute terms. Townsend and the American economist J.K. Galbraith
had already pioneered debate on relative poverty but their success had been limited as a result
of the optimistic sense that increasing prosperity was solving the problem.
Relative poverty or the minimum benefit yardstick
Now  that  the  “forgotten  Englishman”  and  the  “poor  and  the  poorest”  had  been
rediscovered, the welfare state faced a new challenge. In a BBC1 radio broadcast in October
1969, Professor Titmuss, the then vice chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission,
declared  that  “[..]  the  real  and  exciting  challenge  in  the  social  services  today,  is  how
selectively  to  provide  for  the  special  needs  and  special  groups  within  a  comprehensive
universal  structure  of  benefits  and  services.”  Titmuss  continued  by  declaring  that  the
“minimum or (emphasis added) relative standard of poverty” had been raised because of the
greater increase in supplementary benefits13 compared with average industrial earnings. As
mentioned beforehand higher rates of employment generate extra welfare funding but if the
officially recognised minimum “standard” of poverty is defined by minimum benefit levels,
then how can the degree of relative poverty be dealt with except by resorting to discretionary
benefits? This begs the essential question of how to define and measure relative needs. It as
just as difficult - if  not more - to  establish the sort  of needs that  the “average” (fictitious)
individual has within a given community as it is to define minimum standards designed to
ensure that individuals are able-bodied enough to hold down paid employment.
Hence relative deprivation which is a far more dynamic way of conceptualising poverty.
Whereas poverty relates for better  or for worse to a lack of money resources, deprivation
embraces a wide range of poverty indicators.  An individual  who suffers from deprivation
cannot enjoy the sort of consumption patterns that his surrounding environment (community)
suggests he should be entitled to, not only because he does not have the adequate money
resources but also because his  position within his community denies him access to them.
Individuals are thus deprived when their level of income compromises “normal” involvement
in the  community.  They are not  necessarily  poor  in  any absolute  sense but  their  relative
poverty engenders deprivation.
13 National Assistance was replaced by Supplementary Benefits in 1966.
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Ever since Beveridge, the authorities had made a point of refraining from equating National
Assistance and then supplementary benefit levels with “the official poverty line” for a number
of reasons. Firstly, to avoid the stigma that such a correlation would inevitably entail.14 One of
the  great  strengths  of  the  post-war  welfare  state  was  its  universalism which  avoided  the
labelling of benefit claimants. Benefits for the worst-off were designed to help them during
hard times and not bring the further burden of the stigma attached to their particular hardship.
Secondly, should assistance be considered as the official poverty threshold then in theory a
slight rise in benefits would automatically lift vast numbers of people out of poverty.15 The
opposite is also equally valid but either way, the temptation is strong to periodically tinker
with statistics for purely political reasons. To this end, linking official minimum incomes to a
definition  of  poverty  is  particularly  dangerous  because  as  statistics  become  more  readily
available, then it becomes easier for political opponents to underline the weaknesses in social
policies designed to combat poverty.  Claims that certain percentages of the population are
living in poverty can only be verified if an official absolute poverty line is adopted. What is
more, if the number of people relying solely on the minimum poverty line benefits increases,
then the Government is increasingly seen as directly responsible for their standards of living.
It is hardly surprising that according to public opinion the responsibility for defining poverty
lies  squarely in  the hands of  the authorities.  Thus measuring  poverty inevitably  becomes
saturated with political connotations and discussions on poverty follow political lines rather
than  social  considerations.  The  growing  reliance  on  benefits  in  the  1980s  offered  the
Conservatives an easy target in their attack on the welfare state; it is perhaps useful to add that
one of the most prominent features of that period was the considerable rise in the number of
people whose only income was derived from benefits.
In an attempt to come to terms with relative deprivation, Townsend’s 1216-page study of
poverty published in 1979 provided a mass of detailed information on the lifestyles of the
poorest.16 The first  line of the introduction clearly stated the overall  approach to poverty:
“Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of
relative  deprivation” [emphasis  added].  Townsend applied  to his  vast  survey samples  the
indicators of deprivation - namely social, housing, environmental, work and material - that he
had adopted a decade earlier in a previous study. His idea was to establish the patterns of
expenditure required to satisfy basic income needs as dictated by prevailing circumstances.
Townsend came to the conclusion that the poor became aware of their poverty at a cut-off
point somewhere around supplementary benefit rates +40% since at this level of income they
realised that they were excluded from prevailing standards of consumption.17 Thus Townsend
established a deprivation standard by which it was possible to measure (relative) poverty in
the United Kingdom. His figures were breathtaking: “And by the deprivation standard, 22.9
per cent of the sample in households and 25.9 per cent in income units were found to be living
in  poverty  (representing  12,500,000 and 14,000,000 people  respectively).”  (TOWNSEND
895) The sheer size and apparent thoroughness of Townsend’s work lend considerable weight
14 The low take-up of Family Income Supplement (FIS) is one good example of how the poor resist stigmatising 
selectivity even if this means forfeiting their “right” to extra resources. For further information on FIS see 
WHITTON Timothy, “Income Supplementing and the Poverty Trap”, in Patrick BARBER & Timothy 
WHITTON (eds.), The Dynamics of Time at Work: an Anglo-French Perspective, London: the Management 
Centre, 1995, p.114-123.
15 This is precisely what happened in 1966 when National Assistance rates were replaced by Supplementary 
Benefit rates. The latter were slightly higher than the former and thus affected a larger proportion of the 
population. The change in name was synonymous of a rise in poverty which did not correspond at all to reality.
16 It must be remembered even so that the field work for Townsend’s study was carried out at the end of the 
1960s and beginning of the 1970s. When it was published in 1979 although many of the concepts were still 
valid, the statistical information was out of date.
17 TOWNSEND, Poverty in the UK., op. cit., or for a simpler version which includes a reader-friendly graph, see 
David PIACHAUD, “Peter Townsend and the Holy Grail” in, New Society, September 10, 1981, p. 419-421.
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to the strength of his conclusions. Yet in an article in 1981, David Piachaud, another leading
authority on the subject of poverty,  questioned the validity of Townsend’s conception and
measurement  of  relative  deprivation.  Central  to  his  criticism was Townsend’s  deprivation
index:
Table 1: Townsend’s deprivation index
characteristic % of population
1. Has not had a week’s holiday away from 
home in last 12 months
53.6
2. (Adults only). Has not had a relative or 
friend to the home for a meal or snack in the 
last 4 weeks
33.4
3. (Adults only). Has not been out in the last 4
weeks to a relative or friend for a meal or 
snack
45.1
4. (Children under 15 only). Has not had a 
friend to play or to tea in the last four weeks
36.3
5. (Children only). Did not have party on last 
birthday
56.6
6. Has not had an afternoon or evening out for
entertainment in the last two weeks
47.0
7. Does not have fresh meat (including meals 
out) as many as four days a week
19.3
8. Has gone through one or more days in the 
past fortnight without a cooked meal
7.0
9. Has not had a cooked breakfast most days 
of the week
67.3
10. Household does not have a refrigerator 45.1
11. Household does not usually have a 
Sunday joint (3 in 4 times)
25.9
12. Household does not have sole use of four 
amenities indoors (flush WC: sink or 
washbasin and coldwater tap: fixed bath or 
shower: and gas or electric cooker)
21.4
Source: New Society, 10 September 1981, p.419.
Piachaud conceded that Townsend’s research was outstanding since, as a non-economist, he
pioneered attempts to extend “the concept of income to embrace a wider range of resources,
public as well as private[..]” so as to measure poverty in terms of the inequality of wealth and
income.  But  it  was  the  calculation  of  the  deprivation  threshold  that  Piachaud  found
particularly contentious, in other words the way in which Townsend determined a point below
which there was a noticeable acceleration in the harmful effects of relative poverty. Piachaud
argued that the deprivation index includes references to lifestyle rather than poverty: some
well-off people might choose not to eat roast meat on Sundays or not have a cooked breakfast
and these habits are very prone to changes in eating fashions. On the other hand, not having
access to basic commodities such as a sink, wash-basin etc.,  (point 12 on the deprivation
index) are far more valid indicators of poverty since they are considered to be basic amenities
that do not change fundamentally according to fashion or taste. These criticisms were echoed
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a month later when Baroness Barbara Wootton in a letter  to  New Society pointed out the
extent to which the deprivation index could indeed vary according to fashion.18
Another  disagreement  centred  on  the  deprivation  threshold  itself.  Piachaud  stated  that
“[t]he poor in Britain are worse off than others; but for the most part, they are members of
society, not outcasts”. He felt that Townsend’s cut off point separated the poor from the rest
of society as if they were a different category of people with different needs and different
expectations. Added to this was the fact that since Townsend stated from the very outset of his
work that poverty was a relative concept, any sort of threshold between the poor and the non-
poor should be de facto excluded.
Piachaud concluded rather harshly that although Townsend contributed extensively to the
debate on poverty his conclusions were specious, that he confused choice and opportunity and
that by attempting to provide an objective definition of deprivation he encouraged uniformity
at the expense of “choice and freedom”. Townsend replied a week later, rejecting Piachaud’s
main criticisms: 
On the basis of the national evidence, I would reject the view that poverty “no longer
(my [Townsend’s]  italics)  conforms to a  picture  of  Dickensian destitution,  with the
pauper in a pitiable state”, and, elsewhere in his article, that the poor are “not out-casts”.
This is fundamentally to misperceive the relativity of the condition of poor people. They
are living in the society of the 1980s rather than that of 1840-70: and in this context the
conditions of some at least are as bad, or worse, than those which Dickens observed
more than 100 years ago.19 
Piachaud believed that measuring poverty in  absolute terms - as if the sort of conditions
prevalent during Townsend’s survey could be compared with those of the 19th century - was
fundamentally flawed. Townsend believed that in relative terms contemporary poverty could
be compared with 19th century poverty.
In another letter to New Society, John Veit Wilson, then Head of the School of Applied
Social Sciences at Newcastle-upon-Tyne Polytechnic, tried to sort out the semantic confusion
that had arisen. He was anxious that the same words for the same concepts should be used so
that “the important discussion of how and why people are deprived (lacking money or power),
and what should be done about it and by whom” would be easier and clearer. Veit Wilson
summed up the main concepts thus: 
The condition of DEPRIVATION means unmet need. Unmet need is caused by lack of
resources of all kinds (tangible, intangible, inter-personal, intrapersonal). The condition
of POVERTY means lack of money resources. The lack of resources, including money
resources, is caused by the condition of POWERLESSNESS in the social, economic or
political systems.20
Veit Wilson’s use of the word “powerlessness” is not just his way of stealing the semantic
limelight. In many respects powerlessness is another way of expressing relative deprivation
since those who are poor lack the power to enjoy normal involvement in the community. But
powerlessness takes this participation a step further than Townsend’s deprivation index which
concentrated  on  the  consumption  of  material  goods.  Wilson  includes  material  goods  but
extends  the  expectation  of  “normal”  consumption  patterns  to  cover  non  material  items,
involvement in the political system being one of them.
18 Perhaps this is the result of the outdated fieldwork.
19 “Peter Townsend Replies”, in New Society, September 17, 1981, p.477-478.
20 John VEIT WILSON, Letter, in New Society, October 8, 1981, p.76.
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It is important within this somewhat confused context to remember that whatever method is
used  to  measure  poverty,  whichever  definition  is  retained  as  being  the  most  adequate,
academic quibbling was not reducing the effects of poverty in Great Britain. While the experts
crossed  swords  on concepts  the  political  change that  occurred  in  1979 with  the  electoral
victory of the Conservatives was to usher in a new period during which poverty was to be
affected by the same market values as virtually every other walk of British life. In this respect
and with hindsight, the words of David Vincent ring even truer: 
Academics and political writers attacked each other and the Government in articles and
books,  whilst  their  subject  matter  looked  on  in  silence.  The  more  they  criticised
Beveridge, the more they endorsed the assumption that permeated his scheme, that those
threatened with destitution were to be passive recipients of the goodwill of the state.
(VINCENT 513)
When the newly elected Prime Minister boldly stated that “there is no such thing as society.
There are individual men and women, and there are families” the poor were evidently in for a
hard time.
The “right” way of measuring poverty 
During  their  five  years  spent  sitting  on  the  benches  of  Her  Majesty’s  Opposition,  the
Conservatives had had ample time to witness the failings of excessive state intervention. In
this respect, the welfare state was considered not only cumbersome, inefficient and expensive
but also the source of social evils that the New Right was intent on extinguishing: dependence
on the state, the stifling of individual initiative and a lack of responsibility. Tighter monetary
policies since 1976 had forced the Left into realising that generous universal welfare had to be
revised but it was faced with the contradiction of dealing compassionately with the poor while
restraining the scope of welfare benefits. Their political opponents saw in this a way to render
means testing more legitimate while asserting that “a successful competitive economy is the
engine of a compassionate society”.21 The answer lay in targeting poverty more effectively but
the generosity of the state in measuring need was to be dependent on the market. Whereas the
Left was prepared to accept that the state still had a considerable part to play in the eradication
of poverty, the Right, once elected, began shifting the responsibility for poverty on to the poor
themselves, just one small step from unloading the financial burden of anti-poverty policies
on to them too.
In many ways measuring poverty during the Thatcher years became a redundant option
given  that  the  tendency  for  the  Conservatives  was  to  pay  lip  service  to  the  “culture  of
poverty” thesis developed among others by Oscar Lewis and expounded on at great length by
prominent members of the Party such as Sir Keith Joseph. Sir Keith simplified the defini-tion
of poverty thus: “An absolute standard [of poverty] means one defined by reference to the
actual needs of the poor and not by reference to the expenditure of those who are not poor. A
family is poor if it cannot afford to eat” (JOSEPH & SUMPTION 27). The two were perfectly
complementary since according to the culture of poverty thesis the poor had the choice of
accepting their poverty or not. Should they choose to do so then state benefits were adequate
to meet essential needs, adequate nourishment for example. In short, poverty did not exist and
there was no need to measure it.
Prevailing  economic conditions  were  soon to  show otherwise.  When the Conservatives
came to power in 1979, 3 million people were drawing supplementary benefit.  Four years
later a further million had joined the ranks of the unemployed and a government devoted to
21 Hansard, 30 January 1990, col. 212.
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the laws of the market was forced into accepting a rising social security budget.22 This was
rather a setback for a government intent on reducing public expenditure and the proof that
policies designed to break the culture of dependency had in fact had the opposite effect: more
and more people were being driven out of employment and on to benefits or in some cases
into badly paid jobs that required state intervention in order to supplement low pay.
The Conservatives’ belief that the laws of the market would reduce the dependence of the
poor on the state fell wide of the mark. Rather than “trickling down” to the remotest corners
of poverty, wealth tended to remain in the hands of those who were better off. Thus rather
than being dictated by economic circumstances,  the poverty line continued to be linked -
albeit rather crudely - to the levels set annually by the Supplementary Benefits Commission
and  its  successor  from November  1980,  the  Social  Security  Advisory  Committee.  Even
attempts to stigmatise the poor further had failed to reduce their number, and although public
opinion lent  a  sympathetic  ear  to  action  designed  to  identify  a  whole  range of  so-called
“welfare scroungers”, expenditure on social security increased inexorably.  Faced with this
embarrassing reality, a major reform of social security was undertaken in 1984-85 which gave
birth to the Fowler Report and the subsequent 1986 Social Security Act.
Norman Fowler’s Green Paper (1985)  The Reform of Social Security, starts thus: “To be
blunt, the British social security system has lost its way”. Indeed, in January 1984, Fowler had
been informed  by a Policy  Studies  Institute  paper  that:  “The mass  of  old  supplementary
benefit guidance had now been turned into 16,000 paragraphs of enforceable and appealable
rules” (TIMMINS 398). This prompted him into advocating a simplified benefit system for at
the time even the most knowledgeable officials were frequently overwhelmed by the red tape
involved  in  distributing  welfare.  The  Conservatives  were  quite  aware  of  the  alarming
proportions  that  poverty had reached and realised  that  simply  tampering  with  the  figures
would not produce the required results. Fowler’s answer therefore was to suggest that poverty
could be reduced by a better  and more efficient  use of available resources.23 His rhetoric
pleased the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, who was keen to reduce expenditure
on social security;  it also pleased the Party’s hardliners who believed that tough measures
were needed to weed out the undeserving poor. Fowler recommended that social security be
whittled down to the bare minimum and that “needs” testing should be used more extensively
so  that  help  could  be  channelled  more  efficiently  towards  those  suffering  from  “real”
hardship.
As regards actually  measuring  poverty,  the Fowler  Report  reiterated the Conservatives’
official  position that “there is no such thing as an official  poverty line”.  To this  end, the
supplementary benefit yardstick was considered to be unreliable and subject to interpretative
disadvantages: 
For example, basing a poverty standard on the level of supplementary benefit means
that, if the supplementary benefit scale rates are improved relative to other forms of
income, the numbers living in or on the margins of poverty will apparently increase.
This is a purely statistical result. Moreover, an increase in the extent of poverty may be
shown even if the real incomes of all families in the population are rising. It has already
been  seen  that  over  the  period  since  1948,  the  scale  rates  have  risen  significantly
relative to average net earnings. Also, any estimate of the numbers living in poverty
based on a supplementary benefit standard is very sensitive to the precise way in which
it is calculated. Significantly different results would be shown depending for example,
22 During the first Thatcher government for the first time since the war, more unemployed families than 
pensioners were receiving means-tested relief.
23 This included the introduction of sophisticated software that DHSS officials were unable to use leading, in the 
case of housing benefit supplement to huge delays and an overall more bitter climate in the welfare offices.
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on  whether  annual  or  weekly  income  is  used,  or  expenditure  is  used  rather  than
income.24
 Technically speaking Fowler’s arguments were sound and consistent with the reluctance of
governments, both Conservative and Labour, to accept that benefit levels could be considered
to reflect a poverty line endorsed by the authorities. Nevertheless this sober and pragmatic
conception  of  the  poverty line  was to  be dismissed  a few years  later  by the  new DHSS
Minister  John  Moore.  On  May  11  1989  during  a  meeting  at  the  Greater  London  Area
Conservative Political Centre, St Stephen’s Club, Moore’s cynicism reached unprecedented
heights.  In  a  speech  entitled  “The  End  of  the  Line  for  Poverty”  he  poured  scorn  on
Townsend’s  so-called  “rediscovery”  of  poverty  thirty  years  earlier,  adding  that  income
support could not be used as an official poverty line since a rise in levels would quite simply
shift the goalposts. As far as relative poverty is concerned, Moore was even more virulent:
 Claims that one-third of the population was now living in poverty or on its margins
were ‘bizarre’.  When among the poorest  fifth  of  families  70 per  cent  had a  colour
television, 85 per cent had a washing machine and nearly 50 per cent had a car, it was
‘utterly  absurd to  speak as  if  one in  three  people in  Britain  today is  in  dire  need’.
(TIMMINS 450)
But where Moore overstepped his mark was when he alone in a much quoted tirade, deftly
summed up the legacy of the Thatcher years on poverty: 
What the new definition of relative poverty amounts to in the end is simply inequality. It
means that however rich a society gets it will drag the incubus of relative poverty with it
up  the  income scale.  The poverty lobby would,  on  their  definition,  find  poverty in
paradise.
In one fell swoop Moore had said it all: the rioting, people sleeping rough in the streets, the
rise in the number of lone parents, the installation of protective barriers between “clients” and
officials in benefit offices, the rise in crime, repossessions.... poverty was not to blame but
inequality.  The  Conservatives  believed  that  poverty  was  a  legitimate  side-effect  of  the
fundamental right to be unequal.
The official Households Below Average Income Statistics25 published by the Department of
Social Security paint a very vivid picture of the extent of inequality during the decade: 
For the population as a whole, average net income rose by around 35% in real terms
from 1979 to 1990/91. Real income rose for each decile group of the population in the
lower half of the income distribution except the lowest and second lowest. The share of
total income fell for all the lower income groups between 1979 and 1990/91. The lowest
10% of the population accounted for 4.2% before housing costs (BHC) of total income
in 1979 and 2,9% BHC of total income in 1990/91. After housing costs (AHC) the fall
was from 4% of total income in 1979 to 2.1% in 1990/91. There were more people in
unemployed families in the bottom 10% in 1990/91. The proportion increased - from
around 15% of the bottom 10% in 1979 to around 28% in 1990/91 - in line with the
increase in unemployment in the whole population. In 1979, 59% of the population had
income below 1979 average income.  In 1990/91 about  42% of the population  were
below this same income level (i.e. the 1979 average increased in line with inflation).
24 The Reform of Social Security, vol. 3, Cmnd, 9519, HMSO, p.6.
25 Published every two years as opposed to their predecessor Low Income Families published annually.
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The proportion of the population below half  1979 average income in 1979 was 8%
BHC/9% AHC; the proportion below half 1990/91 average income in 1990/91 was 21%
BHC/24% AHC.26
The  Thatcher  years  were  marked  by  a  sharp  increase  in  inequality  and  it  is  in  this
framework that the extension of poverty during the decade can be observed. Some radical
critics  have  even  suggested  that  governments - and  Margaret  Thatcher’s  would  be  no
exception in this respect - deliberately use poverty to ensure a compliant work force.
Conclusion
It is useful to suggest that the history of measuring poverty between 1942 and 1990 follows
three phases. For twenty years after Beveridge there was no point in measuring poverty since
it had been taken care of by the thriving welfare state. The next phase, during which poverty
was “rediscovered” in the midst of plenty, witnessed genuine attempts to assess and quantify
relative  deprivation.  Poverty was considered in terms  of a new set of dynamics.  The last
phase, during the Thatcher years, is for some critics the most shameful: there was ample proof
that poverty was widespread and that the most vulnerable categories were being marginalized
even further by the government’s pursuit of market orientated policies. Whether the Thatcher
Governments  were  right  or  wrong  is  a  subject  of  political  debate.  One  thing  is  certain
however: social policies during the 1980s tended to expose and exacerbate the ugliest possible
aspects of very basic “want”. In this way public opinion was made uncompromisingly aware
of the nature and incidence of poverty, the indubitable signs of an unequal nation.
In their withering attack on the capitalist state, Tonay Novak and Chris Jones concluded by
expressing the distress they feel after having talked at length about so much poverty: 
If  this  book has  done one  thing,  we hope that  it  has  exposed  [...]  inhumanity  and
hypocrisy, and if it leads to one thing we hope it leads to a greater rage against a system
that debases people for private profit. Too many seem to have lost their sense of anger
at what is happening in our midst. Yet without anger the possibilities of fundamental
social and political change will always be elusive. (NOVAK & JONES 202)
However important it may be to feel anger at the development of poverty, effective action
is only possible if  it  can call  on reliable  and accurate  statistics  as the basis  for informed
policy-making.  Measuring  poverty  is  therefore  an  intensely  political  affair,  based  on
fundamental decisions about the kind of society the public wants. 
Université Blaise Pascal Clermont-Ferrand
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